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CREATING A MORE CERTAIN STANDARD
FOR ENHANCED PATENT DAMAGES BY
REQUIRING EGREGIOUSNESS AS AN
ELEMENT IN THE SECTION 284 ANALYSIS
BRIAN BARNES†
ABSTRACT
According to 35 U.S.C. § 284, district courts have the power to
“increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed”
by the jury in patent infringement cases where willful infringement
occurred. Following the recent Supreme Court decision in Halo
Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., it is now less clear how
courts are to go about deciding whether to exercise this power. Halo
established that the decision lies within the discretion of the district
court judge, but declined to give a more concrete standard than urging
the judge to “take into account the particular circumstances of each
case” and only increase damages in “egregious cases typified by willful
misconduct.” This Note proposes a new standard that is consistent with
the Halo framework that will bring more certainty to enhanced
damages decisions.
Under this Note’s proposed standard, before an award of enhanced
damages can be made, the jury must find that infringement was willful,
and the judge must find that the infringement was egregious under the
standards established by the Federal Circuit. The egregiousness of the
infringement is an explicit element that must be established before
enhanced damages can be awarded. After these two elements are
satisfied, the judge would have the discretion to award enhanced
damages depending on the circumstances of the case. The
egregiousness element is a mixed question of fact and law, so factual
determinations made by the lower court are subject to clear error review
and the overall legal determination of egregiousness is subject to de
novo review by the Federal Circuit. This proposed standard would
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allow the Federal Circuit to reduce the uncertainty left by Halo, making
it clear that egregiousness is required for every award of enhanced
damages and providing a framework of specific factors district courts
should weigh in making that determination.

INTRODUCTION
Damages in patent infringement cases can be extreme, with recent
awards reaching over the billion dollar mark.1 These damages are
supposed to be equal to what a reasonable royalty of the patent would
be;2 however, due to language in 35 U.S.C. § 284, the actual damages
can grow to up to three times the reasonable royalty amount.3
According to the statute, the “court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed.”4 Supreme Court precedent
interpreting that language establishes that this power should be
reserved for cases of “willful or bad-faith infringement.”5 Following the
recent Supreme Court decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse
Electronics, Inc.,6 however, it is now less clear how courts are to decide
whether to award these enhanced damages.7
Before Halo, judges deciding whether to award enhanced
damages were guided by the two-part test established by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate
Technology, LLC.8 Under that standard, for a judge to award
enhanced damages, she must find both that the infringer “acted despite
an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement”

1. In December of 2016, a jury in Wilmington, Delaware awarded $2.54 billion to
pharmaceutical giant Merck against Gilead Sciences for infringement of a patent related to a
popular hepatitis drug. See Susan Decker & Christopher Yasiejko, Merck Wins Record $2.5
Billion Patent Verdict Against Gilead, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 5:56 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-15/gilead-told-to-pay-merck-2-54-billion-inhepatitis-c-royalties [https://perma.cc/8L8W-YUT4].
2. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964).
6. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
7. See id. at 1932–35 (establishing that decisions on § 284 enhanced damages are within the
discretion of the district court and giving no specific factors for district courts to apply in the
analysis).
8. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (establishing a twopart test for § 284 decisions requiring objective recklessness and subjective knowledge of the risk
of infringement).
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and that the risk of infringement “was either known or so obvious that
it should have been known to the accused infringer.”9
The Seagate test made clear how a district court judge should
determine whether to treble damages under § 284, but it also created a
potential loophole by shifting the focus of the analysis away from
defendants’ actions at the time of infringement and toward their
attorney’s ability to make arguments at trial.10 If, during trial, defense
counsel could come up with a reasonable argument that a defendant’s
actions did not constitute infringement, the objective prong of the
Seagate test was not satisfied.11 This was true even if the defendant had
not considered or was unaware of the argument when it was actually
infringing.12 For example, consider a defendant who was aware of the
plaintiff’s patent and believed that the patent’s claims cover its product,
but decided to forgo license negotiations and intentionally infringe the
patent. If, during the infringement trial, the defendant’s attorney put
forth a reasonable argument that the claims of the patent did not
actually read on defendant’s product, the Seagate test would not be
satisfied. The fact that, at the time of infringement, the defendant was
not acting on the basis cited in the attorney’s argument is immaterial
and enhanced damages would be precluded. Troubled by this possible
result, the Supreme Court rejected the two-part Seagate test as overly
“rigid” and inconsistent with § 284 in Halo.13
Leaning on Supreme Court precedent for determining the
standard for the patent law attorney fee shifting statute,14 the Halo
Court established that the decision whether to award enhanced
damages lies within the discretion of the district court judge.15 The
Court did not give a specific test or factors for the judge to apply, but
noted that she should “take into account the particular circumstances
of each case” and that enhanced damages “should generally be
reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”16 Though

9. Id.
10. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1926 (noting that the Seagate test makes “the ability of
the infringer to muster a reasonable [even though unsuccessful] defense at the infringement trial”
dispositive on enhanced damages “even if he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even
aware of it”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1932.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
15. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
16. Id. at 1933–34.
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this eliminates the loophole that insulated malicious and bad faith
infringers, it also makes it less clear whether enhanced damages will be
granted and how the judge will actually go about making that decision
or even what factors she will consider. In addition, the language of the
opinion is not clear on whether and to what extent egregiousness is
necessary.17 This lack of clarity is embodied in a split that is emerging
in the pleading standards of district courts applying Halo.18
Halo also established that these decisions will be reviewed for
abuse of discretion on appeal.19 This simplifies the tripartite framework
that had been applied to the Seagate test20 but makes it unlikely that
more clarity will come from appellate review by the Federal Circuit.
The lack of certainty created by Halo is quite unsettling.
Uncertainty in patent law undermines the foundational goal of the
patent system: to encourage innovation and the disclosure of
inventions.21 Uncertainty in the context of enhanced damages affects
patentees, who will now be less sure of the value of their patent, as well
as nonpatentees, who will be less certain about how their actions might
subject them to enhanced damages. Although an actual award for
enhanced damages is rare, willfulness is alleged in the vast majority of
patent infringement cases.22 Thus, even the potential for a finding of
willfulness can have a significant impact on litigation settlements and

17. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (stating that enhanced damages “should generally
be reserved for egregious cases”).
18. One article analyzing district court decisions in the first six months following the Halo
decision found a division in the pleading required for an allegation of willful infringement. The
article found that some courts held that simply pleading that the defendant had knowledge of the
patent was sufficient, while other courts, typically citing Justice Breyer’s concurrence, require a
pleading of egregiousness as well. See Natalie Hanlon Leh & Michael Silhasek, 2 Ways Courts
Approach Willful Infringement After Halo, LAW360 (Jan. 18, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/876994/2-ways-courts-approach-willful-infringement-after-halo
[https://perma.cc/2CDJ-NFFZ].
19. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934.
20. The Federal Circuit determined that the Seagate test was a mixed question of fact and
law. The objective reasonableness prong was subject to de novo review by the Federal Circuit,
whereas the subjective prong was reviewed for substantial evidence. Bard Peripheral Vascular,
Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The overall determination
of whether to grant enhanced damages was then reviewed for abuse of discretion, creating a
tripartite system for reviewing enhanced damages decisions. Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,
649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
21. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2009).
22. A study of 1,721 patent infringement cases in a two-year period from 1999–2000 found
that willfulness was alleged in 92.3 percent of the cases. See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical
Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 231–32 (2004).
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patent licensing fees because of the financial impact of trebled damages
awards.23
The potential impact of an enhanced damages award highlights
another issue with the Halo framework: lowering the standard for
granting enhanced damages. Though the Court in Halo notes that
enhanced damages should be awarded only in egregious
circumstances,24 its framework makes maintaining this standard
unlikely. The abuse of discretion appellate review requires that the
district court “based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence” in order to be reversed.25
Such deferential appellate review does not allow the Federal Circuit to
ensure that enhanced damages are actually limited to egregious cases
by the district courts.26 Following Halo, it is unclear what kind of
conduct district courts should look for when deciding enhanced
damages awards.27 It is therefore unlikely that the Federal Circuit will
find a district court decision to be based on “a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence,”28 even when a defendant’s conduct was
not actually egregious enough to make enhanced damages appropriate.
For example, suppose a district court awards enhanced damages
because the defendant received a letter giving them notice of the patent
at issue as well as several other patents that allegedly cover their
product, and did not seek the advice of counsel as to whether they were
infringing any of the patents. Even if the defendant lacked malicious
intent and the infringement had a short duration, a decision awarding
enhanced damages likely would not meet the abuse of discretion
standard even though the infringement is not truly egregious enough
to warrant treble damages.
Whereas Halo created uncertainty and a lowered standard, the
alternative seemed to be maintaining the two-part standard of Seagate
and its loophole that “insulat[ed] some of the worst patent infringers
23. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1937 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the “risk of
treble damages can encourage [a] company to settle, or even abandon any challenged activity”).
24. Id. at 1932.
25. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
26. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982)
(noting that “broad judicial review is necessary to preserve the most basic principle of
jurisprudence that ‘we must act alike in all cases of like nature.’” (quoting Ward v. James, [1986]
1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A.))).
27. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932–35 (establishing that decisions on § 284 enhanced
damages are within the discretion of the district court and giving no specific factors that district
courts should apply to this analysis).
28. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405.

BARNES IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

620

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2017 11:01 AM

[Vol. 67:615

from any liability for enhanced damages.”29 This Note proposes an
approach that provides a more balanced solution to the § 284 analysis
than either of the Halo and Seagate tests.
Under this Note’s proposed standard, before an award of
enhanced damages can be made, the jury must find that infringement
was willful, and the judge must find that the infringement was
egregious under the standards established by the Federal Circuit. After
these two elements are satisfied, the judge would have the discretion
to award enhanced damages depending on the circumstances of the
case. This proposed standard makes the egregiousness of the
infringement an explicit element that must be established before
enhanced damages can be awarded, resolving part of the uncertainty
left by Halo as to whether and what extent egregiousness is actually
required.30 Similar to the question of whether a patent is nonobvious,
this element is a mixed question of fact and law, so factual
determinations made by the lower court are subject to clear error
review and the overall legal determination of egregiousness is subject
to de novo review by the Federal Circuit.31 This allows the Federal
Circuit to establish factors for determining when infringement is
egregious, such as the “closeness of the case,” “duration of defendant’s
misconduct,” “remedial action by defendant,” and “defendant’s
motivation for harm,”32 to help ensure that enhanced damages are only
applied in cases warranting such an award.33
This standard closes the loophole created by the objective prong
of Seagate that enabled willful and malicious infringers to escape
enhanced damages if their lawyers could come up with a reasonable
argument at trial. It also allows the Federal Circuit to better achieve its
purpose of bringing uniformity and clarity to patent law,34 a goal which

29. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
30. For further discussion of the uncertainty created by Halo, see infra Part III.A.
31. Per 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012), for an invention to be patentable it must be nonobvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art given the prior art that existed at the time the patent application
was filed. The Federal Circuit has determined that the question of whether an invention is obvious
or not is a “conclusion of law based on the factual underpinnings” determined by the finder of
fact. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
reviews the factual findings supporting this conclusion for clear error, but applies de novo review
to the ultimate conclusion of whether a patent is obvious or not in light of those factual findings.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
32. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
33. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (noting that enhanced damages are “reserved for
egregious cases of culpable behavior”).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981).
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has been explicitly recognized as an important consideration by the
Supreme Court.35
Part I of this Note reviews the background of enhanced damages
in patent law, including the history of § 284 and the development of the
doctrine interpreting and applying it up through Seagate. Part II
analyzes Halo’s rejection of the two-part Seagate test and discusses how
the Halo Court relied on its reasoning from a prior case interpreting
§ 285, which governs attorney fee shifting in patent infringement
cases,36 and why this reliance was misplaced. Part III discusses the
issues that arise from Halo’s regime of granting discretion to district
courts on enhanced damages, including abuse of discretion appellate
review, coupled with the removal of any concrete guiding standards.
The Halo framework injects innovation-harming uncertainty into the
enhanced damages analysis. The Court’s assertion that reliance on
“[n]early two centuries of exercising discretion in awarding enhanced
damages”37 is unavailing because recent changes in the patent
ecosystem have had a significant impact on the policy considerations
weighing on enhanced damages. Part IV outlines the proposed § 284
enhanced damages standard noted above, establishing egregiousness
as a required element and allowing for meaningful de novo review by
the Federal Circuit of that element to ensure that enhanced damages
are only granted in appropriate cases. This proposed standard will
allow the Federal Circuit to reduce the uncertainty left by Halo,
making it clear that egregiousness is required for every award of
enhanced damages and providing a framework of specific factors
district courts should weigh in making that determination.
I. BACKGROUND OF ENHANCED DAMAGES: 35 U.S.C. § 284 AND
PRE-HALO DOCTRINE
The language of the enhanced damages provision of § 284 is short
and simple: “[the] court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed.”38 On its face, it gives no guidance to
courts on their ability to award enhanced damages in patent cases.

35. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (noting that
“Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court
for patent cases” to bring “desirable uniformity” to patent law).
36. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (noting that the Court’s “recent decision in Octane
Fitness arose in a different context but points in the same direction”).
37. Id. at 1934.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
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Therefore any analysis of the proper application of this power requires
examining the statute’s history and the doctrine that has evolved
around it.
A. 35 U.S.C. § 284: Evolution from Mandatory to Discretionary
Trebled Damages
As the Court noted in Halo, enhanced damages are a very old part
of patent law.39 According to the Patent Act of 1793, trebled damages
were the minimum amount that could be awarded for any successful
patent infringement suit.40 Trebled damages were mandatory due to
fears that most juries would be anti-patent, causing inventors to worry
that they would not be able to fully assert their rights against
infringers.41 Therefore enhanced damages were thought as a necessary
additional incentive for inventors to disclose their work through the
patent system.42 This provision was revised in 1800, but maintained
mandatory trebled damages and made them the required amount
instead of the minimum.43 These early statutes highlight that damages
for patent infringement were originally viewed as “punitive and not
merely compensatory in nature.”44
That attitude shifted when the Patent Act of 1836 did away with
mandatory trebled damages in patent infringement and instead
allowed courts to increase damages “not exceeding three times the
amount [of the jury’s award], according to the circumstances of the
case.”45 This provision made enhanced damages discretionary, but like

39. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1928.
40. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836) (stating that damages
are to be “a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has
usually sold or licensed to other persons”).
41. See Jon E. Wright, Note, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages—
Evolution and Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 99–100 (2001) (“Historian Edward
Waltersheid posits that this portion of the Patent Act was the result of lobbying by Joseph
Barnes . . . . [Barnes] feared most people would be anti-patent and reluctant to award damages.”
(footnote omitted) (citing EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 209–10 (1998))).
42. Id. at 100.
43. Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (repealed 1836).
44. See Wright, supra note 41, at 100 (noting that Circuit Judge Story stated that patent
damages should be “estimated as high, as they can be, consistently with the rule of law” so that
“wrong doers may not reap the fruits of the labor and genius of other men” (quoting Lowell v.
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass. 1817))).
45. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2012)).
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the current version, did not give any guidance as to the standard that
should apply to the decision to increase damages.46
The statute was revised twice more in 1946 and 1952, but neither
revision included any substantive change to the trebled damages
provision.47 Legislative history from the 1946 revision indicates that
trebled damages were meant to serve a deterrent purpose in addition
to their traditional punitive role.48 The standard for damages in patent
infringement cases was changed to a reasonable royalty of the patent,
so the rationale was that “[w]ithout the fear of triple damages,
potential infringers would have little incentive to seek a license.”49 If
an infringer would only have to pay a reasonable royalty fee as
damages, they might be tempted to risk litigation instead of negotiating
on the front end for a license of the patent. While the purpose for the
now discretionary ability to treble damages is clear from the legislative
history, the language of the statute still left it up to the courts to
develop the doctrine controlling when that ability should be exercised.
The following section discusses the evolution of that doctrine leading
up to the Federal Circuit’s Seagate decision.
B. Pre-Seagate Doctrine: Focusing on Totality of the Circumstances
and the Affirmative Duty To Seek Advice of Counsel
Due to the lack of guidance from the statutory language,50 courts
have had to develop a doctrine to guide the application of § 284. In
Seymour v. McCormick,51 an early decision overturning an award of
enhanced damages, the Supreme Court indicated that enhanced
damages were only appropriate for “wanton or malicious” conduct.52
The Court recognized that the prior rule mandating trebled damages
in all successful infringement suits was “manifestly unjust” because it
46. See Wright, supra note 41, at 101 (“When Congress . . . [made] treble damages the
maximum discretionary amount, they did not provide any guidance with respect to when treble
damages should be awarded.”).
47. See id. at 100 (“Section 284 of the Patent Act of 1952, which governs today, made no
substantive changes to the treble damages provision of 1836.” (footnote omitted) (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 284)).
48. S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946) (trebled damages were meant to “discourage
infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that all he would be required to pay would be a
royalty”).
49. Wright, supra note 41, at 100.
50. For further discussion of the language of § 284, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853).
52. See id. at 489 (holding that “where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict
vindictive or exemplary damages”).
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equated parties who “acted in ignorance or good faith” with “the
wanton or malicious pirate.”53
While applying the standard established in Seymour, courts began
to include defendants’ reliance on the advice of counsel that they were
not infringing the patent as a mitigating factor in the analysis.54 The
recognition of this mitigating factor evolved into a “suggestion by
several circuit courts of an affirmative duty to obtain an opinion of
counsel” to avoid enhanced damages.55
After it was established as the sole venue for patent law appeals in
1982,56 the Federal Circuit in Underwater Devices Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen Co.57 solidified the affirmative duty to obtain advice of
counsel, at least in cases where the defendant had “actual notice of
another’s patent rights.”58 In addition to cementing this duty,
Underwater Devices held that the determination of whether to award
enhanced damages was to be a “totality of the circumstances” test.59 In
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,60 the Federal Circuit gave lower courts more
guidance on how to analyze the “totality of the circumstances” by
summarizing a list of nine factors courts should consider when
weighing the circumstances of a case.61 Read Corp. emphasized that
finding willful infringement did not mandate enhanced damages and
that the “paramount determination” in enhanced damages decisions

53. Id. at 488.
54. See Wright, supra note 41, at 103 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co., 282 F.2d 653, 662 (7th Cir. 1960)) (noting that the court in Union Carbide Corp. concluded
that the defendant’s reliance on the opinion of counsel indicated that they had acted in good faith,
so enhanced damages were not appropriate).
55. Id.
56. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)) (creating the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and granting it exclusive jurisdiction over patent law appeals).
57. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 1389–90.
59. Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting
Underwater Devices Inc., 717 F.2d at 1390).
60. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 827. The nine factors were: 1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas
or design of another; 2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection,
investigated the scope of the patent, and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it
was not infringed; 3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; 4) defendant’s size and
financial condition; 5) closeness of the case; 6) duration of defendant’s conduct; 7) remedial action
by defendant; 8) defendant’s motivation for harm; and 9) whether defendant attempted to conceal
its misconduct. Id.
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“is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts
and circumstances.”62
The Federal Circuit then took the affirmative duty one step
further, establishing that the failure of a party to assert that it sought
the advice of counsel “would warrant the conclusion that it either
obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its
importation and sale of the accused products would be an
infringement.”63 This put significant pressure on parties to produce
their communications with their patent counsel, which would waive the
attorney-client privilege for those communications.64 The Federal
Circuit recognized that this doctrine had “resulted in inappropriate
burdens on the attorney-client relationship” in Knorr-Bremse Systeme
Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.65 Knorr-Bremse rejected the
idea that an adverse inference could arise from a defendant asserting
attorney-client privilege or failing to obtain advice of counsel as to
infringement.66 It did not go so far as to overrule Underwater Devices
however, and it reinforced that “there continue[d] to be ‘an affirmative
duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of
others.’”67
The decision in Knorr-Bremse was later criticized for not explicitly
stating what was required of infringement defendants to satisfy the
affirmative duty of due care.68 This confused state of the doctrine set
the stage for the Federal Circuit’s next big shift on enhanced damages
in Seagate.

62. Id. at 826.
63. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled
by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
64. See John Dragseth, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Opinions of
Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 167, 167–68 (1995) (discussing the waiver of
attorney-client privilege that resulted from asserting opinion of counsel letters to avoid willful
patent infringement).
65. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
66. Id. at 1344–47.
67. Id. at 1345 (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
68. See Debra Koker, Fulfilling the “Due Care” Requirement After Knorr-Bremse, 11 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 154, 155 (2005) (“Although the decision upheld the sanctity of the attorneyclient privilege, it did not go nearly far enough in informing potential litigants how to shape their
behavior.”).
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C. In re Seagate: A Bright Line Test Requiring Objective
Recklessness
Three years after it pulled back on the duty to obtain advice of
counsel in Knorr-Bremse,69 the Federal Circuit overruled the
affirmative duty from Underwater Devices altogether in Seagate.70
Seagate held that the Underwater Devices standard set too low a bar for
enhanced damages.71 Recognizing that the relevant statutes provide no
definition for “willfulness,” the Federal Circuit turned to Supreme
Court precedent interpreting the term in the context of punitive
damages and determined that willfulness includes “reckless
behavior.”72 According to Seagate, the issue with Underwater Devices
was that its standard allowed enhanced damages for behavior “that is
more akin to negligence,” a characterization that “fails to comport with
the general understanding of willfulness in the civil context.”73 Seagate
also clarified that it was overruling the affirmative duty to seek advice
of counsel to avoid enhanced damages.74
Building on the idea that “willfulness” included reckless conduct,
Seagate established what would become known as the two-part test for
enhanced damages.75 It noted that recklessness was defined by the civil
law as someone acting “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”76 This
definition helped establish the two prongs of the test. The first prong
required that “a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”77 With the objective
requirement satisfied, the second prong then required that “the
patentee . . . demonstrate that this objectively defined risk . . . was
either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the
accused infringer.”78

69. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH, 383 F.3d at 1344–47 (holding that
there was no longer any adverse inference from the failure to obtain the advice of counsel for an
infringement defendant).
70. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1370–71.
73. Id. at 1371.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The establishment of an objective recklessness requirement was a
significant shift from the previous “totality of the circumstances”
doctrine79 and the affirmative duty of Underwater Devices.80 Members
of the patent community predicted that this new standard would make
it much more difficult for a plaintiff to prove willful infringement and
that courts would be much less likely to award enhanced damages.81 An
empirical study on the effects of Seagate found that it actually had a
“relatively small” effect on the number of infringements that were held
to be willful.82 Therefore it appears that concerns about the difficulties
for patent plaintiffs after Seagate were largely overblown.
Although worries about the effects of Seagate may have been
exaggerated, the objective prong did create a controversial loophole
that allowed even potentially willful and malicious defendants to
escape enhanced damages.83 “The state of mind of the accused
infringer [was] not relevant” to the objective prong.84 This meant that
even if the accused infringer intentionally copied the patented
invention, the objective prong might not be satisfied if its attorney
could come up with a reasonable argument at trial that the claims of
the patent did not cover their actions or were invalid.85
After Seagate, the Federal Circuit addressed the appellate review
framework applied to the two-part test.86 The court established that
objective recklessness was a mixed question of fact and law and that
“the court is in the best position for making the determination of

79. Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
80. See Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389–90 (establishing an affirmative duty for a
potential infringer to seek the advice of patent counsel once he has “notice of another’s patent
rights”).
81. See Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In
Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 431–32 (2012) (discussing practitioner
reaction to the establishment of the Seagate test).
82. See id. at 441 (finding that “willfulness was found in approximately 10% (11.0%) fewer
cases” in the first three years after Seagate, which was not a statistically significant difference).
83. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (noting that the
Seagate test makes “the ability of the infringer to muster a reasonable (even though unsuccessful)
defense at the infringement trial” dispositive on enhanced damages).
84. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
85. For further discussion of the loophole in the Seagate test, see supra notes 10–13 and
accompanying text.
86. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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reasonableness.”87 The objective prong of the test was therefore
subject to de novo review, while the subjective prong remained a
question for the jury subject to substantial evidence review.88 However,
the ultimate decision of whether to award enhanced damages was still
subject to an abuse of discretion standard.89 This was referred to as the
“tripartite framework” by the Supreme Court in Halo.90
II. THE HALO DECISION: DISMANTLING THE SEAGATE STANDARD
In 2016, the Supreme Court again weighed in on enhanced patent
damages in Halo, reversing nearly all the Federal Circuit doctrine
developed in the preceding decade.91 In Halo, the Court rejected the
objective prong of the Seagate test and replaced it with a standard that
put the decision in the discretion of the district court.92 The Court’s
reasoning relied heavily on its prior ruling in Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,93 which concerned patent law’s attorney
fee shifting statute, 35 U.S.C. § 285.94 This reliance was misplaced. An
independent analysis of enhanced damages doctrine would have
allowed the Court to establish a standard that avoided the issues of the
Seagate test while maintaining certainty and a higher standard for
enhanced damages awards. Section A of this Part discusses the Court’s
rejection of the objective prong of Seagate. Section B discusses the
Court’s reliance on its Octane Fitness reasoning, and Section C
discusses the distinctions between enhanced damages and attorney fee
shifting that made such heavy reliance misplaced and inappropriate.
A. Rejection of the “Overly Rigid” Objective Prong of Seagate
Halo’s most significant change was rejecting the objective prong
of Seagate and placing the entirety of enhanced damages decisions
within the discretion of the district court.95 The Court noted that the
policy behind the Seagate test was actually sound because it

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1007–09.
89. Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
90. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016).
91. See id. at 1932–35 (invalidating the two-part Seagate test as well as the tripartite
framework for appellate review and the clear and convincing evidence requirement).
92. Id.
93. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
94. Id. at 1755–1758.
95. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935.
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“reflects . . . that enhanced damages are generally appropriate . . . only
in egregious cases.”96 Despite this policy justification, Halo found that
the test did not allow for the discretion connoted by § 284 and was
“unduly rigid” and “insulat[ed] some of the worst patent infringers
from any liability for enhanced damages.”97 Troubled by the loophole
created by Seagate’s objective prong, the Court condemned the fact
that, even for a “wanton and malicious pirate,” a plaintiff must show
there was an objectively high likelihood that the defendants’ actions
constituted infringement.98
The Court emphasized that Seagate’s sound policy of limiting
enhanced damages had gone too far and was insulating “wanton and
malicious pirate[s]” so long as their counsel could come up with a
reasonable argument that they were not infringing.99 The loophole had
shifted the focus of the analysis away from the actions and state of mind
of defendants while the infringement was happening, and toward the
ability of their counsel to come up with arguments at trial.100 This
impeded the deterrent purpose of § 284 to prevent willful and wanton
infringement because whether the defendant was willful or malicious
might not matter.101 Halo therefore rejected the Seagate test and held
that the enhanced damages determination lies within the discretion of
the trial court, which should “take into account the particular
circumstances of each case” and only award enhanced damages in
“egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”102
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized that enhanced
damages should be strictly limited to egregious circumstances.103 He
also suggested that defendants did not need to seek the oftenexpensive advice of patent counsel, but could rely on the advice of a

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1932 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1755).
98. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (holding that the objective recklessness
requirement “excludes from discretionary punishment many of the most culpable offenders, such
as the ‘wanton and malicious pirate’ who intentionally infringes another’s patent” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1853))).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1933 (noting that Seagate had made “dispositive the ability of the infringer to
muster a reasonable (even though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement trial”).
101. See id. (noting that “even if [the defendant] did not act on the basis of the defense or was
even aware of it,” the defendant could still defeat the objective prong of the Seagate test and
prevent enhanced damages).
102. Id. at 1933–34.
103. Id. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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“scientist, engineer, or technician” that there was no infringement to
show good faith and insulate them from enhanced damages.104
Following the rejection of the two-part Seagate test, Halo also
rejected the clear and convincing evidence standard the Federal Circuit
had applied to enhanced damages determinations.105 It replaced “clear
and convincing” with the typical “preponderance of the evidence”
standard for civil cases.106 Halo also struck down the tripartite
framework for appellate review that applied to the Seagate test107 and
replaced it with an abuse of discretion appellate standard.108
This new appellate standard is a major source of the issues created
by the Halo framework. By failing to announce a reasonably concrete
standard for the § 284 analysis and establishing such a deferential
standard of review for appeal, Halo created an uncertain and less
rigorous standard for enhanced damages awards.109 The reasoning and
justification for these changes relied heavily on a recent decision
interpreting a different, but in the Court’s view, analogous statute:
§ 285 attorney fee shifting.110
B. Halo’s Reliance on Octane Fitness and § 285 Fee Shifting
After the Supreme Court’s ruling on the patent law attorney fee
shifting statute § 285, commentators predicted that a similar ruling on
§ 284 enhanced damages would naturally follow.111 Both statutes
involve damages determinations decided by the court, have similar
Federal Circuit tests established for them, and do not give much
guidance for their application.112 Therefore it seemed likely that the
Court would simply borrow its holding from Octane Fitness and apply
it to enhanced damages. To a certain degree, that is exactly what the
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1934.
106. Id.
107. For further discussion of the tripartite framework, see supra note 20.
108. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934.
109. For further discussion of uncertainty created by Halo, see infra Part III.
110. For further discussion of Halo’s reliance on attorney fee shifting, see infra Part II.B.
111. See generally Howard Wisnia & Thomas Jackman, Reconsidering the Standard for
Enhanced Damages in Patent Cases in View of Recent Guidance from the Supreme Court, 31
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 461 (2015) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should change the
§ 284 enhanced damages doctrine following the Supreme Court’s ruling on attorney fee shifting
in Octane Fitness).
112. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (stating that the “court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed”), with § 285 (stating that “[t]he court in exceptional
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”).
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Court did in Halo. Not only did the Court make similar changes to the
enhanced damages framework as it did for attorney fee shifting, but it
explicitly relied on its prior decision in Octane Fitness to support much
of its reasoning in Halo.113
Section 285 allows courts to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party in “exceptional” patent infringement cases.114 Prior to Octane
Fitness, the Federal Circuit had established a two-part test for when a
case was “exceptional”—similar to the Seagate test.115 This test was
applied nearly identically to the Seagate standard, such that a finding
of willfulness under Seagate was enough to make a case “exceptional”
under § 285.116
The Supreme Court rejected the two-part standard for § 285 as
“unduly rigid” in Octane Fitness because it “superimpose[d] an
inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible.”117
Octane Fitness held that the determination of whether to award
attorneys’ fees is entirely in the discretion of the district court.118 In a
subsequent case, the Supreme Court held that because of the
discretionary nature of § 285 decisions, the abuse of discretion standard
of review should be applied on appeal.119
Halo made multiple mentions of its similarity to Octane Fitness,
and the “unduly rigid” language used to describe the Seagate test is
quoted directly from the Octane Fitness opinion.120 It also directly
relied on Octane Fitness in rejecting the objective prong of the Seagate
test, the clear and convincing evidence standard, and the “tripartite
framework for appellate review.”121 The only qualification given in
113. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (rejecting the objective requirement of the
Seagate test like the Court had rejected the “objectively baseless” requirement for attorney fee
shifting in Octane Fitness because “subjective bad faith alone” was enough to satisfy the proper
standard for both statutes).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
115. See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (requiring that a case was “brought in subjective bad faith” and was “objectively baseless”
in order to be exceptional under § 285).
116. See Don Zhe Nan Wang, End of the Parallel Between Patent Law’s § 284 Willfulness and
§ 285 Exceptional Case Analysis, 11 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 311, 319–23 (2016) (discussing the
parallel application of the § 285 exceptional case analysis with the § 284 enhanced damages
standard before Octane Fitness).
117. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
118. Id. at 1757.
119. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014).
120. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016).
121. See id. at 1932–34 (holding that the “recent decision in Octane Fitness arose in a different
context but points in the same direction” of rejecting the objective prong, that “Octane Fitness is
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applying the analysis from Octane Fitness is that it “arose in a different
context.”122 That “different context” has much more significance than
it was given in Halo, however.
C. Halo’s Reliance on Octane Fitness is Misplaced: § 284 Enhanced
Damages are Distinct from § 285 Attorney Fee Shifting
The “different context” of attorney fee shifting noted in Halo123 is
distinct from the context of enhanced damages in three ways: the
underlying conduct evaluated for its application, its intended scope,
and its legislative history. These distinctions show that the reasoning
used to analyze § 285 should not have been applied to § 284. Halo
should have evaluated the doctrinal and policy considerations behind
the enhanced damages standard independently of the Octane Fitness
reasoning. This would have allowed the Court to fashion a solution that
more adequately addresses the concerns of enhanced damages without
its decision creating the issues that it does.
The first distinction between the attorney fee shifting and
enhanced damages statutes is the underlying conduct evaluated in
determining whether either statute should apply. In attorney fee
shifting, courts are focused on the actions of the parties in the context
of litigation brought before them. The Supreme Court’s definition of
an “exceptional” case in Octane Fitness focuses on whether a case
“simply . . . stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner
in which the case was litigated.”124 Section 285 allows courts to sanction
a party for bringing nonmeritorious claims or acting unreasonably
during litigation, making this provision similar to other common
sanctioning powers of federal trial courts.125
In contrast, the main focus of the enhanced damages analysis is on
the defendant’s commercial actions before the litigation is initiated.126
again instructive” on the clear and convincing evidence standard, and that “[b]ecause Octane
Fitness confirmed district court discretion to award attorney fees . . . such decisions should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion” as should enhanced damages).
122. Id. at 1932.
123. Id.
124. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
125. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (allowing the court to award “excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees incurred because of” a party’s vexatious litigation practices); FED. R. CIV. P.
11 (allowing sanctions against a party for making claims in any signed pleading that are not
“warranted by existing law” or where the “factual contentions [lack] evidentiary support”).
126. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (establishing factors for
determining whether enhanced damages are appropriate such as “whether the infringer, when he
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Common issues in the § 284 analysis, such as whether the defendant
had notice or knowledge of the patent or whether it obtained an
opinion of counsel that it was not infringing, concern actions taken
outside of the litigation process.127 Awarding enhanced damages is
therefore unlike the trial court’s other sanctioning powers, so the same
standard should not necessarily apply.
When determining that the abuse of discretion standard should
apply to attorney fee shifting, the Court stressed that “the district court
‘is better positioned’ to decide whether a case is exceptional because it
lives with the case over a prolonged period of time.”128 The district
court has firsthand experience with the litigation practices of the
parties, which is the basis for the decision under § 285, giving the
district court a substantial advantage over a reviewing appellate court.
This advantage is significantly diminished in the case of § 284 enhanced
damages. There, the district court bases its determination on the
defendant’s out-of-court conduct as established by the evidence on the
record. This means that an appellate court, which bases its review on
the record established below, is in a much better position to review an
award of enhanced damages than an award of attorneys’ fees.
The second distinction between attorney fee shifting and
enhanced damages is the intended beneficiaries for each provision.
Attorney fee shifting may be awarded to either party,129 which gives
defendants a potential mechanism to deter frivolous patent suits.
Despite the creation of some cheaper alternative procedures for
invalidating patents by the America Invents Act,130 defendants may still
be forced to incur significant expenses defending against even frivolous
claims.131 This is especially significant in cases brought by nonpracticing
knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a goodfaith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed” and the “duration of the defendant’s
misconduct”).
127. Id.
128. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–560 (1988)).
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (stating that the court may award fees to the prevailing party,
which may be either the plaintiff or the defendant in a given case).
130. One of the procedures created by the America Invents Act was the inter partes review.
This allows a patent’s validity to be challenged on the grounds of 35 U.S.C. § 102 novelty or 35
U.S.C. §103 nonobviousness before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The Board is then
required to give a decision on this challenge within twelve months, which makes this a much faster
and cheaper alternative to district court litigation. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–316 (2012).
131. A survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Association found that
in 2015 the median litigation costs for suits with between $1 million and $10 million at risk was $2
million while the median costs for a case with more than $25 million at risk was $5 million. See
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entities because they have more incentives to bring claims “that have
just a slim chance of success.”132 The standard for attorney fee shifting
needs to be flexible to allow district courts to deter this type of
behavior.133
The policy considerations favoring a lower and flexible standard
for attorney fee shifting do not apply to § 284. Enhanced damages
awards only benefit plaintiffs134 and are intended to deter defendants
from refusing to license a patent because they would otherwise only
have to pay reasonable royalty damages if found liable for
infringement.135 Unlike the flexible standard needed for attorney fee
shifting, the policy considerations for enhanced damages favor a more
rigorous standard, in part because the attorney fee shifting provision
already deters some of the conduct enhanced damages are aimed to
prevent.136
The third distinction between attorney fee shifting and enhanced
damages is the legislative history of the respective statutes, particularly
with respect to district court discretion. Octane Fitness noted that the
original statute for attorney fee shifting in patent cases explicitly stated
that the decision was “in [the court’s] discretion.”137 Though the explicit
mention of discretion was removed from the statute when it was
recodified, the Court found that “the recodification did not
substantively alter the meaning of the statute.”138 This legislative
history provided a strong presumption for placing attorney fee shifting

AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015, at 37 (2015),
https://www.accmeetings.com/AM16/faculty/files/Article_482_7928_LitSpend___AIPLA_2015_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3H8-ACVK].
132. Nonpracticing entities have an advantage over defendants who actually manufacture
products because “they have far fewer documents to produce, fewer witnesses and a much smaller
legal bill than a company that does make and sell something.” They also do not have the threat
of a counterclaim or harm to their market reputation to deter them from bringing lawsuits that
have a low chance of success. See Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Opinion,
Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25.
133. Id.
134. Enhanced damages are only available after compensatory damages have already been
assessed to a prevailing claimant. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
135. For further discussion of the purposes of enhanced damages, see supra notes 48–49 and
accompanying text.
136. For further discussion of need of a rigorous standard for enhanced damages
determinations, see infra Part III.B.
137. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014)
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)).
138. Id.
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decisions in the discretion of the district court in Octane Fitness,139
which is what led to abuse of discretion standard of review being
applied in Highmark.140
The legislative history of § 284 lacks this explicit language about
district court discretion. Although the 1836 revision made enhanced
damages awards discretionary in the sense that they were no longer
mandated when a plaintiff prevailed,141 it did not include an explicit
statement that the decision was in the discretion of the district court.
Taken alone, the absence of such language does not show that the
abuse of discretion standard of review is inappropriate here, but it does
make it inappropriate for Halo to simply apply the reasoning from the
§ 285 analysis to enhanced damages.142
The distinctions between enhanced damages and attorney fee
shifting illustrate why it was inappropriate for the Halo Court to rely
on the Octane Fitness and Highmark decisions when determining the
new standard for enhanced damages. If Halo had analyzed § 284
independently of attorney fee shifting, it would have been better able
to formulate a more balanced framework. This framework could have
avoided both the rigidity of Seagate and the uncertainty and lowered
standard created by Halo. The following section will focus on these two
effects of the Halo decision.
III. THE HALO FRAMEWORK CREATES AN UNCERTAIN AND LESS
RIGOROUS STANDARD FOR ENHANCED DAMAGES AWARDS
While the Seagate test created the loophole that allowed even
willful and malicious infringers to escape enhanced damages,143 it also
established a clear framework for how the § 284 analysis was applied.144
When Halo rejected the Seagate test, it not only got rid of the loophole,
139. Id.
140. See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014)
(holding that “an appellate court should review all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination
for abuse of discretion” based on the holding in Octane Fitness).
141. For further discussion of the shift from mandatory to discretionary enhanced damages,
see supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
142. For further discussion of Halo’s reliance on its reasoning from Octane Fitness, see supra
notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
143. For further discussion of the loophole created by Seagate, see supra notes 10–13 and
accompanying text.
144. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (requiring an
objectively high likelihood that the defendant was infringing and that the risk of infringement was
either “known or so obvious that it should have been known” to the defendant for enhanced
damages to be awarded).
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but it also got rid of the clarity and predictability that Seagate had
brought to the enhanced damages analysis.
Halo places the decision of awarding enhanced damages within
the discretion of the district court, but it does not establish a concrete
test beyond “tak[ing] into account the particular circumstances of each
case” and limiting enhanced damages to “egregious cases typified by
willful misconduct.”145 This standard does little to advise potential
defendants about conduct that could subject them to trebled
infringement damages. Coupling this uncertain standard with the
abuse of discretion appellate review146 could prevent meaningful
review by the Federal Circuit and lead to a lowered standard for
enhanced damages in practice.
A. The Lack of a Concrete Standard in Halo Injects InnovationChilling Uncertainty into the Enhanced Damages Framework
The Federal Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse decision—which eliminated
the adverse inference from claiming attorney-client privilege but
maintained an affirmative duty to avoid infringing known patent
rights147—was criticized for not giving enough guidance to parties on
how to act to avoid enhanced damages.148 Those same criticisms apply
with equal force to Halo. As one practitioner noted, “[t]he practical
issue is predicting where the line will ultimately fall between typical
infringement and egregious cases, as well as what an accused infringer
should do . . . to be on the safe side of that line.”149 Although Halo has
successfully done away with the rigidity that doomed the Seagate test,150
it gives little to no guidance for how judges should now decide these
cases or how parties should act to avoid enhanced damages.
Halo cautioned that the discretion it granted district courts should
be limited to “egregious” cases,151 but what is egregious in the context

145. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016).
146. See id. at 1934 (establishing that abuse of discretion appellate review shall be applied to
enhanced damages determinations).
147. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1347–
48 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
148. For a further discussion of criticisms of the Knorr-Bremse decision, see supra Part I.B.
149. Attorneys React to High Court’s Patent Damages Ruling, LAW360 (June 13, 2016, 6:52
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/806367/attorneys-react-to-high-court-s-patent-damagesruling [https://perma.cc/HZV7-6FC8] (quoting Terry L. Clark, Bass Berry & Sims PLC).
150. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (overruling the two-part Seagate test because it
was “unduly rigid”).
151. Id. at 1934.

BARNES IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/5/2017 11:01 AM

EGREGIOUSNESS AS AN ELEMENT FOR § 284

637

of patent infringement is not self-defining. There may be cases where
it is clear the alleged infringer was a “wanton and malicious pirate,”
making enhanced damages clearly appropriate under Halo.152 There
will also be cases where egregiousness is far from clear, such as a case
where the defendant had knowledge of the patent and did not seek the
advice of counsel, but had independently developed the technology
and lacked malicious intent, such as using its cost advantage in avoiding
licensing fees to drive out a competitor who had licensed the
technology. With a punishment as harsh as trebling damages in an area
of law where damages are already notoriously high,153 an unclear
standard is particularly troubling.
It is also unclear whether and to what extent egregiousness is
necessary for an award of enhanced damages under Halo. Language in
the majority opinion stating that enhanced damages are “generally
appropriate” and “should generally” be granted only in egregious
circumstances154 creates this uncertainty. Although Justice Breyer’s
concurrence attempts to clarify that this language is more mandatory
than precatory,155 the limited precedential value of a concurrence limits
its effectiveness. This uncertainty has already taken concrete form in
district courts applying Halo, with a split developing over whether a
plaintiff must plead egregiousness as part of a claim for enhanced
damages.156
The lack of clarity in the Halo standard is compounded by the
abuse of discretion appellate review that will apply to all enhanced
damages decisions.157 This standard is highly deferential to the district
court.158 While empirical studies have shown that the relationship
152. See id. at 1932 (noting that the “wanton and malicious pirate” is among the “most
culpable offenders,” suggesting enhanced damages would clearly be appropriate for such a
defendant (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 480, 488 (1853))).
153. A patent litigation study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP found that the
median patent damages award from 2011–2015 was $7.3 million. CHRIS BARRY ET AL.,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE WE AT AN
INFLECTION POINT? 4 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/
2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G3E-WCSS].
154. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932–34 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1936.
156. Leh & Silhasek, supra note 18.
157. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934.
158. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (requiring that a court
“based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence” to be reversed for an abuse of discretion); see also Kevin Casey, Jade Camara & Nancy
Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED.
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between standard of review and reversal rates is more nuanced than
expected,159 the deferential nature of abuse of discretion review could
potentially restrict meaningful review by the Federal Circuit,
preventing it from giving shape to what constitutes an egregious case.
Under an abuse of discretion review, an appellate court can only
overturn the district court “if it based its ruling on an erroneous view
of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”160 Two
different district courts could have substantially different
interpretations of egregiousness under this standard without either
interpretation constituting an “erroneous view of the law” or being a
“clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”161
In fact, a divergence in the application by district courts has
already emerged, with some courts requiring plaintiffs to plead
egregiousness to make out a claim for enhanced damages and others
not.162 One article analyzing district court decisions in the first six
months following the Halo decision found a division in the pleading
required for an allegation of willful infringement.163 The article noted
that some courts held that simply pleading that the defendant had
knowledge of the patent was sufficient, while other courts, typically
citing Justice Breyer’s concurrence, required a pleading of
egregiousness as well.164 Under the abuse of discretion standard of
review, the Federal Circuit will likely be unable to reestablish
uniformity in these types of situations.
Though some uncertainty in the law is unavoidable, uncertainty in
the context of patent law is especially harmful because it can

CIR. B. J. 279, 286 (2002) (noting that the abuse of discretion standard is “[t]he most lenient
standard of review”).
159. Although the Supreme Court has made clear that the abuse of discretion standard “does
not preclude an appellate court’s correction of a district court’s legal or factual error,” the high
level of deference built into this standard will allow a large amount of variation in what constitutes
an egregious case by the district courts. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1744, 1749 n.2 (2014). Empirical studies have shown that standards of review may affect the
outcome of cases, but the relationship is the subject of ongoing debate. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins,
Changing Standards of Review, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 229–32 (2016) (reviewing several
empirical studies); see also Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts:
An Empirical Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 24–25 (conducting an empirical study and finding the
relationship between standards of review and case outcomes is more nuanced than expected).
160. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405.
161. Id.
162. Leh & Silhasek, supra note 18.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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undermine innovation.165 This is illustrated by the very creation of the
Federal Circuit, which acts as the singular forum for patent appeals in
hopes of bringing uniformity and certainty to patent law.166 Therefore
a standard that injects as much uncertainty into the law as Halo should
be avoided unless plainly called for by Congress. This Note does not
propose that the Seagate test was the appropriate framework; however,
the uncertain Halo standard is not the only alternative. A rule that
avoids rigidity while maintaining clarity for both the judges who apply
it and the parties it is applied to would be superior to both the Seagate
and Halo approaches.
B. Halo’s Abuse of Discretion Appellate Review Effectively Lowers
the Standard for Enhanced Damages Awards
In addition to generating the uncertainty discussed above, another
issue with the Halo framework is that it will likely make it much easier
for plaintiffs to obtain enhanced damages.167 This is troubling because
shifts in the modern patent law landscape show that the standard for
enhanced damages should be a high bar, reserved only for extreme
cases. The Supreme Court recognized this principle somewhat in Halo
itself, reemphasizing that enhanced damages were only warranted in
egregious circumstances.168 Though this appears to set a high bar for
the Halo standard, the deferential abuse of discretion review prevents
the Federal Circuit from ensuring that it remains that way in practice.
This Section will discuss three aspects of modern patent law that
illustrate why Halo erred in failing to providing a practical method for
maintaining a high standard for enhanced damages awards.
First, counter to the fear that juries would be anti-patent, which
led to the first enhanced damages provision in the Patent Act of 1793,169
modern juries are actually pro-patent.170 A study conducted by jury

165. For further discussion on the importance of certainty in patent law, see supra notes 21–
23 and accompanying text.
166. For further discussion on the creation of the Federal Circuit, see supra note 56.
167. See Attorneys React to High Court’s Patent Damages Ruling, supra note 149 (many of the
practicing attorneys interviewed expressed the opinion that it will be much easier for plaintiffs to
win enhanced damages following the Halo decision).
168. For further discussion on Halo’s emphasis on granting enhanced damages only in
egregious circumstances, see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
169. For further discussion on the enhanced damages provision in the Patent Act of 1793, see
supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
170. See Casey Anderson & Chuck Kauffman, Why US Juries are Pro-Plaintiff, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., Feb. 2009, at 42, 42 (noting that a recent study found that plaintiffs won more than
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consultants Chuck Kauffman and Casey Anderson found that jurors
have a high regard for the inventors and the Patent and Trademark
Office and believe the review process for obtaining a patent is thorough
and rigorous.171 Sixty-six percent of mock jurors participating in the
study supported the patent owner after they were given a neutral
statement of facts without any argument or evidence from either
side.172 With jurors favoring patent holders in this way, the added
incentive of enhanced damages is unnecessary to convince inventors to
disclose their work through the patent system.
The second factor counseling for a high standard for enhanced
damages awards is the possibility of parties recovering attorney fees in
“exceptional” cases under § 285.173 The possibility of attorney fee
recovery lessens the need for the deterrent purpose of enhanced
damages noted in the 1946 amendment.174 Even without enhanced
damages, if a defendant refuses to negotiate for a license because they
only will have to pay reasonable royalty damages, they might still be
liable for the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees if the substantive strength of
their case is exceptionally weak.175 Therefore, parties are deterred from
an “infringe now, pay later” strategy even without the threat of § 284
because attorney fees in patent litigation suits are often substantial.176
Though there is still an added deterrent effect from enhanced damages,
the availability of another deterrent mechanism lowers the need for
reliance on enhanced damages and favors only applying it in extreme
cases.
The third factor weighing in favor of a rigorous § 284 standard is
the emergence of firms that “generate revenue by sending letters to
‘tens of thousands of people asking for a license or settlement’ on a
63 percent of patent infringement jury trials and discussing the various factors for juries’ propatent tendencies).
171. Id. at 43.
172. Id. at 42.
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”); see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (holding that an “exceptional” case for the purposes of § 285 fee
shifting is “simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party’s litigation position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated”).
174. For further discussion of the deterrent purposes of the 1946 amendment to § 284, see
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
175. See Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (holding that a case may be “exceptional” for
the purpose of § 285 attorney fee shifting if it “stands out from others with respect to the
substantive strength of a party’s litigation position”).
176. For further discussion of the cost of attorneys’ fees in patent litigation cases, see supra
note 131.
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patent ‘that may in fact not be warranted.’”177 Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Halo touches on this problem, noting that “the risk of
treble damages can encourage [a] company to settle, or even abandon
any challenged activity” when it receives one of these letters.178 It will
likely cost the company “considerable time, effort, and money
obtaining expert views about whether some or all of the patents
described in the letter apply to its activities” in order to avoid the
possibility of trebled damages.179 Maintaining a rigorous standard for
enhanced damages would limit the impact of this type of activity
because innovators could navigate these scenarios more confidently.
They would not be concerned with facing trebled damages in every
case of infringement where they had some notice of the patent.
The abuse of discretion appellate review established in Halo180
prevents the Federal Circuit from ensuring that the standard for
awarding enhanced damages remains as high as the three above factors
indicate that it should. Under Halo, a district court judge may award
enhanced damages against a defendant whose conduct falls short of the
high bar that is appropriate for modern patent law, but the Federal
Circuit would likely be unable to correct this error. The abuse of
discretion standard of review only allows them to reverse when the
ruling below is based on “an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence.”181 This deferential review
coupled with the lack of concrete factors for the analysis means that
only the most outlandish enhanced damages awards would fall within
the Federal Circuit’s ability to correct. The outlandish decisions are not
the only ones that can chill innovation. Awarding enhanced damages
when the defendant’s conduct is only slightly below the appropriate
standard would erode it over time, and the inability of the Federal
Circuit to correct these decisions could lead to a much lower standard
being applied to the § 284 analysis.
Though Halo was right to reject the objective prong of Seagate for
shifting the focus of the § 284 analysis away from the defendant’s
conduct at the time of infringement, Halo’s alternative solution poses
significant issues as well. A framework that avoids the rigidity and
177. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 (2016) (quoting Brief for
Internet Companies as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1923 (Nos. 14-1513, 14-1520), 2016 WL 344490).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1934.
181. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
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focus shifting issues of Seagate as well as the uncertainty and lowered
standard issues of Halo would be a superior approach. The following
section lays out a framework that would accomplish this.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: ESTABLISHING EGREGIOUSNESS
AS AN INDEPENDENT ELEMENT OF THE § 284 ENHANCED DAMAGES
FRAMEWORK
To avoid the issues of both Seagate and Halo, the Federal Circuit
should adopt a standard for § 284 that makes a finding of egregiousness
an independent element required for awarding enhanced damages.
Like it did for nonobviousness determinations,182 the court should
classify egregiousness as a mixed question of law and fact, applying
clear error review to any factual determinations made below, but
applying a de novo standard of review to the overall legal
determination of egregiousness. Determining that infringement was
willful should also remain a required element that is a question of fact
for the jury, reviewable for substantial evidence as it was before
Halo.183 The ultimate decision of whether to award enhanced damages
after establishing that infringement was both willful and egregious
should remain within the discretion of the district court and therefore
be subject to an abuse of discretion review. The deferential aspect of
this standard makes it consistent with Halo in that enhanced damages
are not required even “follow[ing] a finding of egregious
misconduct.”184
This proposed standard would therefore create a tripartite
appellate review framework similar to that applied to the Seagate
test.185 The key difference is that it focuses the analysis on the conduct
of the defendant at the time of infringement and not on whether
defendants’ attorneys could come up with a reasonable argument at
trial. Under this standard, before a district court judge could award a
successful plaintiff enhanced damages under § 284, she would first have
to make independent findings that the defendant’s infringement was
egregious. The judge would still have the discretion not to award

182. For further discussion of the standard the classification of nonobviousness
determinations as a mixed question of fact and law, see supra note 31.
183. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that “willfulness ultimately presents a question of fact”).
184. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
185. For further discussion of the tripartite framework applied to the Seagate standard, see
supra note 20.
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enhanced damages even if the willful and egregious elements were met,
if the circumstances of the case did not make them appropriate.
This standard differs from the current Halo framework in two
ways: the requirement of egregiousness as an element of the § 284
analysis and the standard of review applied to that element. Both of
these differences contribute to avoiding the principal issues created by
Halo, namely, the uncertainty it generated and its lowered standard for
awarding enhanced damages.186
A. Requiring Egregiousness as an Independent Element for § 284 to
Bring Clarity to the Enhanced Damages Analysis
Requiring that infringement be egregious before enhanced
damages are awarded is consistent with Halo.187 The majority notes
that enhanced damages “should generally be reserved for egregious
cases typified by willful misconduct.”188 Justice Breyer’s concurrence
also stresses that because of the “patent-related risks” created by
enhanced damages, courts must “ensure that they only target cases of
egregious misconduct.”189 By making egregiousness an explicit element
for enhanced damages awards, this proposed standard clarifies that this
language establishes a mandatory requirement before a district court
can exercise its discretion to treble damages.
There are two issues with Halo’s approach to egregiousness. The
first is that it is unclear what its language actually requires of both
parties and courts applying § 284. The division in pleading standards
emerging in district courts since Halo shows the effects of this
uncertainty and has already created separate standards for parties
depending on the district in which the suit is brought.190 The second
issue is that egregiousness is not a self-defining term, and it is unclear
what it means in the context of willful patent infringement. Even if a
district court interprets Halo as requiring it to find that infringement
was egregious before awarding enhanced damages, it is not clear what

186. For further discussion of issues created by Halo, see supra Part III.
187. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (noting that “enhanced damages are generally
appropriate under § 284 only in egregious cases”).
188. Id. at 1934.
189. Id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190. For further discussion of the emergence of separate pleading standards for enhanced
damages, see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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egregious infringement looks like for any particular defendant except
a “wanton and malicious pirate.”191
Requiring a finding of egregiousness as an element would address
both of the issues with Halo’s approach. It would clarify that the court
must make an explicit finding of egregiousness before it could award
enhanced damages, which would settle part of the uncertainty that
currently exists.192 It would also allow the Federal Circuit to develop a
multifactor analysis for determining when a defendant’s infringement
was egregious, using factors similar to those outlined in Read Corp.193
Clearly establishing that district courts should consider factors such as
“whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
another,” the “closeness of the case,” the “duration of defendant’s
misconduct,” “remedial action by defendant,” and the “defendant’s
motivation for harm,”194 among others, would guide courts applying the
enhanced damages analysis and help maintain uniformity throughout
different districts. It would also assist defendants in avoiding the type
of egregious behavior enhanced damages are meant to deter, and it
would give plaintiffs guidance on how to actually prove egregious
conduct by the defendant.
In addition, this approach would not create the same rigidity issues
as the objective prong of the Seagate standard.195 The Seagate standard
“insulat[ed] some of the worst patent infringers” because they could
avoid enhanced damages if they could come up with a reasonable
argument that it was not objectively likely that they were infringing.196
It did not matter whether the infringer had “act[ed] on the basis of the
defense or was even aware of it” at the time of the infringement.197
Requiring egregiousness as an element would not create this loophole

191. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (noting that a major issue with the Seagate test
was that it prevented enhanced damages from being awarded against some “wanton and malicious
pirate[s]” who are the “most culpable” patent infringers (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1853))).
192. For further discussion of the uncertainty developing under Halo, see supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
193. For further discussion of the Read Corp. factors, see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
194. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
195. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (holding that Seagate was overly rigid because “a
district court may not even consider enhanced damages for such a [wanton and malicious] pirate,
unless . . . his infringement was ‘objectively’ reckless”).
196. Id. at 1933 (noting that the Seagate test “mak[es] dispositive the ability of the infringer
to muster a reasonable (even though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement trial”).
197. Id.
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because subjective bad faith by the infringer could be enough to make
infringement egregious. Although the Federal Circuit could establish
that an objective likelihood that the defendant was infringing is an
aggravating factor in determining if infringement was egregious, it
would not be rigidly required, so this standard would not mirror the
issues of the Seagate test.
B. Classifying Egregiousness as a Question of Law to Maintain a
High Standard for Enhanced Damages Awards
The second distinction of the proposed standard, applying de novo
appellate review to the legal determination of egregiousness, also helps
avoid both the uncertainty and the lower standard created by Halo.
Halo relies on the “[n]early two centuries of exercising discretion in
awarding enhanced damages” to ensure that enhanced damages are
granted only in egregious cases.198 Changes to the patent landscape
over the course of those two centuries makes reliance on past cases of
discretion unavailing.199 Enhanced damages may not be appropriate in
a case arising today when they would have been appropriate if that case
took place thirty years ago. Also, modern policy considerations favor
maintaining a high standard for awarding enhanced damages in patent
cases, but the current abuse of discretion appellate review could
prevent the Federal Circuit from ensuring that the standard remains
high.200
Applying de novo appellate review to the egregiousness element
would allow the Federal Circuit to make sure that only infringement
that is egregious in the context of the modern patent landscape is the
basis for enhanced damages awards. The Federal Circuit is a
specialized court that is well positioned to consider and apply patent
policy considerations,201 so this power is more appropriate for the
Federal Circuit than for district courts.
Unlike abuse of discretion review, which requires that the district
court “based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly
198. Id. at 1934.
199. For further discussion of the issues with the abuse of discretion standard of review
applied to enhanced damages determinations, see supra Part III.B.
200. For further discussion of the effect of the abuse of discretion standard of review, see
supra Part III.B.
201. The Federal Circuit was established as the sole venue for patent law appeals in hopes of
creating “[g]reater certainty and predictability” in patent law which “would foster technological
growth and industrial innovation.” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study
in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989).
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erroneous assessment of the evidence”202 to be overturned, de novo
review would allow the Federal Circuit to independently assess the
egregiousness finding made below.203 Though this may be more time
and resource intensive than abuse of discretion review, the impact that
a trebled damages award can have justifies this added expense. Also,
the Federal Circuit is already well versed in applying this type of review
to other contexts of patent law,204 which helps mitigate the effect of the
added expense. De novo review also helps prevent cases where a
district court awarded enhanced damages when infringement was not
actually egregious, but the decision did not violate the highly
deferential abuse of discretion standard.205
In his Halo concurrence, Justice Breyer notes that he believes the
Federal Circuit may still “take advantage of its own experience and
expertise in patent law” in applying the abuse of discretion review.206
This statement, however, does not assuage the concerns with the abuse
of discretion standard noted above. First, the limited precedential
value of a concurrence limits its effectiveness. Second, the abuse of
discretion review must be considered in context with the uncertainty of
the Halo standard.207 So, although Justice Breyer does point out one
instance where there may be an abuse of discretion—when a district
court makes an error as to “the reasonableness of a defense that may
be apparent from the face of [a] patent”208—the law under Halo is not
clear enough to determine that a district court based its determination
on an “erroneous view of the law” in most instances.209 For example, it
is not clear that Halo requires a district court to even consider the
reasonableness of defenses that Justice Breyer mentions, so it may not
be an “erroneous view of the law”210 for a district court to award
enhanced damages without undertaking that analysis in the first place.

202. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
203. See Casey et al., supra note 158, at 285 (noting that when the Federal Circuit applies de
novo review it “will reach its own conclusion on the issue ‘without deference to that of the district
court’” (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995))).
204. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012), see
supra note 31.
205. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405 (requiring that a district court must have “based its
ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence” to
be overturned for abuse of discretion).
206. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1938 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring).
207. For further discussion of the uncertainty of the Halo standard, see supra Part III.A.
208. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1938 (Breyer, J., concurring).
209. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405.
210. See id.
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This highlights the importance of both differences of the proposed
standard in fixing the issues with the Halo framework.
This Note’s proposed standard also would retain the flexibility and
respect for district court discretion emphasized in Halo211 by keeping
the ultimate decision of whether to award enhanced damages in the
discretion of the district court. Even if infringement was found to
satisfy the willful and egregious elements of the proposed standard, the
district court still would have the discretion to refuse trebling damages,
taking into consideration both the punitive and deterrent purposes of
§ 284.212 This is consistent with Halo’s assertion that “none of this
[opinion] is to say that enhanced damages must follow a finding of
egregious misconduct.”213
Preserving the discretion of district courts also makes this standard
consistent with at least a narrow reading of Halo.214 This means that
this standard could be adopted by the Federal Circuit directly, without
the Supreme Court overruling Halo, which makes it a much more
practical option. Issues caused by the uncertainty of the Halo standard,
such as the division in pleading standards that has already developed
in the district courts,215 are likely to come up on appeal to the Federal
Circuit. Those cases would give the court the opportunity to establish
this standard and bring clarity to the § 284 doctrine.
One of the primary purposes for creating the Federal Circuit as
the sole venue for patent law appeals was maintaining uniformity and

211. See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (majority opinion) (holding that “[§] 284
permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints
of the Seagate test”).
212. For further discussion of the purposes of § 284, see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying
text.
213. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
214. The Federal Circuit could interpret Halo as requiring that the ultimate decision to award
enhanced damages be left to the discretion of the district courts and subject to discretionary
review as well as precluding any rigid test focusing on the objective nature of the infringer’s
actions as opposed to its subjective intent. See id. at 1932–34 (holding that the Seagate test was
“unduly rigid” because of the requirement of the objective prong and that § 284 “gives district
courts discretion in meting out enhanced damages,” so “that decision is to be reviewed on appeal
for abuse of discretion” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014))). The standard proposed here is consistent
with both of those aspects of Halo because the egregiousness element does not require objective
recklessness and the ultimate decision remains in the discretion of the district courts.
215. For further discussion of the emergence of different pleading standards for enhanced
damages, see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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clarity in patent law,216 so a standard that furthers this purpose is
preferable to one that precludes it. The Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the importance of this policy consideration in the context
of patent claim construction,217 and there is no reason why it would
have less relevance in the § 284 analysis. Particularly because the
solution proposed here would allow the Federal Circuit to accomplish
this purpose while avoiding the pitfalls of the Seagate standard and
staying consistent with Halo, it should be adopted by the Federal
Circuit.
CONCLUSION
The enhanced damages provision of § 284 can be a powerful tool
to deter and punish wanton and malicious patent infringement. If the
provision is not applied with a proper standard, it can also deter
innovation and technological progress. The Supreme Court rightly
struck down the Seagate test for its rigid focus on objective
recklessness, a feature which created a loophole for defendants who
otherwise should have been liable for enhanced damages.218 In doing
so it undermined the Federal Circuit’s ability to achieve one of its
founding purposes: to maintain uniformity and certainty in patent law.
It also prevented the Federal Circuit from ensuring an appropriately
rigorous standard for enhanced damages awards.
The solution proposed here gives the Federal Circuit the ability to
achieve both of the above goals more effectively through de novo
review of the new element of egregiousness. This element would act as
a required benchmark that plaintiffs must meet for a district court to
exercise its discretion in awarding enhanced damages. Unlike the
objective recklessness benchmark of the Seagate test, this element
would appropriately focus on the actions of the defendant at the time
the infringement was taking place, and not on the ability of their
counsel to muster arguments at trial. Given these advantages and the
fact that it is consistent with a narrow reading of Halo, the Federal

216. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (describing how a “single court to hear patent
appeals” would increase uniformity in patent law).
217. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (noting that “Congress
created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent
cases” to bring “desirable uniformity” to patent law).
218. For further discussion of the loophole created by the Seagate test, see supra notes 99–102
and accompanying text.
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Circuit should adopt this new framework for enhanced damages,
restoring clarity and consistency to this area of law.

